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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GLENN C. SHAW,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs .
ASHLEY L. ROBISON,
Defendant-Appellant,
KOVO, INC., a Utah
corporation,

No. 13823

Defendant,
vs.
FIRST MEDIA CORPORATION,
a Delaware corporation,
Intervenor-Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Appeal from the District Court of Utah County,
the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge*

INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
In view of the license taken by respondent in its
brief with respect to the facts, it is fortunate that
respondent does not dispute that this is an equity

proceeding.. The court thus has an opportunity to review both the law and the facts to avoid any misimpressions.

Reiman v. Baum, 115 Utah 147, 203 P.2d 387

(1949).
Respondent's- brief is replete with inaccuracies,
omissions, mis-statements, and exaggerations which result in the respondent falling far short of its stated
objective to "set forth a complete statement of facts."
(Respondent's Brief, p. 2)
For example, appellants have never disputed the
fact that the trial court appointed a receiver in September, 1973, for the stated purpose of selling and liquidating the assets of the corporation as is indicated on
page 6 of Respondent's Brief.

Such order, however, was

in addition to the court's specific directive to the
appellants, at the same time the receiver was appointed,
that if the appellants could resolve the corporate deadlock the court would immediately dissolve the receivership.

(T. September 6, 1973, p. 76)

Also,the court

at the same time directed that the owners remained free
to sell the KOVO stock to one another or to third parties.

(T.

September 6, 1973, p. 75)

By conveniently over-

looking these facts the respondent has sought to
create the impression that the owners were not authorized to continue to attempt to resolve their differences after a receiver was appointed —

a fact which

is simply not true as the record demonstrates and is
also demonstrated by the owners1 continued negotiations and good faith which ultimately resulted in a
settlement of all differences.
First Media Corporation's counsel makes repeated
reference to the fact that neither of the owners appealed
various intermediate orders and attempts to ascribe to
this fact some sort of significance.
dent's Brief, pp. 6, 14, 18)

(e.g. Respon-

Since counsel has not

objected to this court considering the matters embraced in the various orders, it can only be assumed
that the issues posed by such orders are properly before the court but that the respondent is more comfortable destroying straw men than confronting the merits
of the appeal.
First Media Corporation's initial offer is characterized by its counsel as a "detailed four-page, single

space offer (containing) essential contract terms."
(Respondent's Brief, p. 8)

An examination of this

document (FMC Exhibit 1, June 28, 1974) will reveal,
that not all of the "four-detailed pages" directly
concern the terms of the offer nor does it contain
all essential contract terms as the differences between this letter and the later contract demonstrate.
The captioned material on page 8 of Respondent's
Brief indicates that First Media Corporation submitted
the "highest and best offer" within the time deadline
set by the receiver.

Once again, by failing to acknowl-

edge the other offers considered by the court and submitted after this time,

respondent purposefully ig-

nores the fact that the respondent's offer was actually
not the highest or best offer, but that the offer submitted by appellant Shaw had "an inherent advantage"
(R. 170), and that the receiver ultimately favored
respondent's proposal for "Solomon like" reasons.
(R. 170-172)
Respondent takes considerable effort to point out
in its "complete statement of facts" the effort and expense it went through after the February hearing, and

substantiates its position in part with exhibits which
were accepted by the court over the objections of
appellant's counsel for a limited purpose totally
unrelated to the proposition for which the respondent
now attempts to utilize them.

(T. June 28, 1974,

P.43}
Contrary to the respondent's representations, the
question of reliance is not actually relevant to this
appeal.

If a contract were actually created at the

time respondent alleges, the lower court's action can
be upheld without considering this issue.

But if a

contract was not consummated, as the appellants
strongly urge, any change in respondent's position
would make no difference since respondent is charged
with notice of the receiver's limited authority.
Utilization by the respondent of such an ill-conceived
legal position illustrates the respondent's willingness
to assume any possibly conceivable position in order to
prevail.
In the note at page 44 of respondent's brief,
First Media Corporation's counsel contends that the onerous $75,000 indemnification escrow is "neither
unreasonable or inconsistent with paragraph 2 of the

.5..

(purportedly) accepted offer.

The amount involved is

precisely the same, and the mechanical process of
payment is the '. . . flesh on the bones 1 ."

(Emphasis

added*)
Once again the license respondent has taken with
the facts is demonstrated by comparison to paragraph 2
of First Media's letter offer (FMC Exhibit #1, June 28,
1974) which states:
Upon acceptance of this offer, FMC
and/or Richard E. Marriott and/or other
principal stockholders of FMC shall cause to
be deposited in an escrow account to be
mutually agreed upon the principal sum of
Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000). The
application of this Escrow Deposit toward
payment of the net purchase price as
described in paragraph 1 shall be governed
by the terms and conditions of the Escrow
Agreement.
The agreement ultimately approved by the court
(R. 189-218) provides in paragraph 4 for a $25,000
escrow.

(R. 19 5)

It further provides in paragraph

4(b)(2) (R. 196) for a $75,000 indemnification escrow,
the onerous terms of which are found at R. 390.
After a review of these provisions, it is difficult to determine how respondent's counsel can represent that "the amount involved is precisely the same"

or that all that is involved is "flesh on the bones".
(Respondent!s Brief, p. 4 4 ) . This is a new, highly
significant, and onerous term not found in respondent's letter offer.

Through a careful choice of

words, that the indemnification escrow is not "inconsistent" with paragraph 2 of the letter offer,
respondent has created a serious misimpression.

Such

sophistry has no place before an appellate court.
The misleading nature of First Media Corporation's
factual recital is illustrated best of all by the representations at page 13 of its brief that by order
dated February 22, 1974, the court accepted its offer,
in making this statement respondent apparently feels
it has divined a fact not discernible by the receiver,
by the receiver's counsel, by the owners of the radio
station, or even by the court, as later proceedings
indicate.

In May, 1974, the receiver recognized

that a binding contract had not been made, the receiver,
in making motion for approval of a contract, requested
"that the court enter its order approving the execution
of the document by the receiver in a manner which is
binding upon KOVO, Inc."

(R. 186-187)

.7.

Receiver's counsel also testified in June that he
understood a contract had not been consummated:

[W]hat I intended to do as counsel
for the receiver was to negotiate, complete the negotiations of the contract
along the lines of the FMC offer, and I
understand procedurally it would be resubmitted to the court for final approval.
THE COURT: I suppose you thought
you were carrying out the Order of February 22?
MR. ROBERTS: That is what I thought
I was doing . . . procedurally I understand there would have to be further approval by the court.
(T. June 28, 1974, p. 137)
The court itself, as indicated in the proferred
Affidavit of Gary Stott, advised the parties on March
15, 1974, that it had not approved any sale to First
Media Corporation, but had only granted respondent
the exclusive and limited right to negotiate with the
receiver.

(R. 311)

R

ARGUMENT
'.'••...•

POINT I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE RECEIVER'S MOTION TO AUTHORIZE EXECUTION OF
SALES CONTRACT.
A.

In order for the proposed contract of sale to

be in any respect binding or effective it required the
further specific approval of the lower court.
Throughout respondent's brief there is a basic failure to understand that the reason for the difficult
position in which respondent finds itself is its elementary failure to recognize and acknowledge that judicial acceptance of a report and recommendation of a
receiver is not tantamount to acceptance of an offer
to purchase the underlying property.
Respondent does not seriously dispute the analysis
and explanation of judicial sales applicable to this
proceeding as explained in appellants1 brief.
pondent's Brief, p. 21-22)

(Res-

Where a judicial sale is

not regulated by statute, a court essentially makes its
own law subject to the use of sound discretion.
v. Schiller,

Chapman

95 Utah 514, 83 P.2d 249, 251 (1938).

A

bidder at a judicial sale bids at his peril, and any bid

.9.

remains

an offer to purchase until it is accepted

and confirmed by the court.

47 Am. Jur.2d, Judicial

Sales, § 136 p. 407.
Respondent apparently further concedes that any
bidder at a judicial sale bids with notice that the
sale is subject to judicial confirmation, and that
confirmation may be withheld to protect the rights of
the property owner or those having an interest in it.
47 Am. Jur. 2d Judicial Sales, § 136 p. 407.
Respondent, apparently not being able to locate
any authority contrary to that cited by appellants,
suggests that the cases of Freebill v. Greenfield,
204 F.2d 907 (2nd Cir. 1953) and Morris v. Burnett,
154 F. 617 (8th Cir. 1907) (cited at pages 21-22 of
Respondent's Brief) actually stand for the proposition
that separate acts of acceptance and confirmation are
only necessary when an offer is first accepted by an
officer other than the court itself, such as by a
receiver.

Such a simplistic solution is not helpful.

Obviously since a judicial sale involves a contract
between the court and a separate entity, the court
must confirm any arrangements made by an agent of the

.10.

court on its behalf.

Equally obvious, the fact that

an offer must only be confirmed once by the court
does not mean that the receiver or other agent of
the court is precluded from receiving authorization
or instruction from the court as often as necessary
during the course of the receivership.
As indicated in Chapman v. Schiller, supra, where,
as here, the procedure to be followed in a judicial
sale is not regulated by statute, the court has wide
discretion in formulating a procedure appropriate for the
particular situation.

Once, however, the court has

determined to follow a particular procedure in making a
judicial sale, the court is obliged to adhere to the
self imposed rules.

Here, the court devised an alter-

nate approach to resolution of the stockholder dispute.
Contrary to respondent's assertion that such an alternative approach is "wholly unsupported by the record" and
"would clearly constitute a fraud upon bona fide thirdparty purchasers" (Respondent's Brief, p. 23) the record
is very clear that this is the manner in which the court
chose to proceed.

j.

As noted in 2 Clark on Receivers, § 519 at 835:

It has been held that a bidder at
a receiver's sale acquires no enforceable
rights until his bid is accepted by the
court. . .

And because the court has wide latitude to establish
rules for proceeding on a judicial sale which are
appropriate to the particular situation the respondent's contention that such a procedure would "constitute a fraud upon bona fide third party purchasers"
is absurd since respondent had notice of the court's
procedure.

Joseph Nelson Plumbing & Heating Supply

Co. v. McCrea, 64 Utah 484, 231 P. 823 (1924).

Despite

respondent's attempt to obfuscate its meaning (compare
p. 40 of Respondent's Brief with pp. 43-44 of Appellants' Brief) this case stands for the proposition that
the court retains this wide latitude at all times.

As

Joseph Nelson Plumbing indicates, the court has wide
discretion to set aside a judicial sale.
The court appointed a receiver in September, 1973,
for the purpose of selling and liquidating the assets
and business of the corporation.

(R. 106, 108)

At

the same time, the court directed that the owners of
the business should continue to attempt to reach a
solution between themselves, and that if such a solution were reached the court would dissolve the receivership.

(T. September 6, 1913,

p. 76)

Significantly,

the court also explicitly directed that the owners
should remain free to sell and transfer their stock
in the business to whomever they pleased.
ber 6, 1973, p. 75)

(T. Septem-

The court did not subsequently

limit in any manner the right of the owners to continue
to seek a solution to the deadlock.

Indeed, the ab-

sence of any indication to the contrary in the record
following the specific authorization to continue to
negotiate fully supports the owners1 position and understanding.
Respondent's attempt to fabricate support for its
position suggesting that the court assigned related financial disputes between the owners to a separate judge
is not, even by respondent's standards, competent evidence to refute the specific references in the record
that the court did in fact approve of a dual approach.

(Respondent's Brief, p. 24, note.)
Respondent spends much time in its brief attempting
to demonstrate that, according to basic principles of
contract law, it is not unusual for a basic agreement to
be reached between separate parties and later to have
this agreement translated into a more detailed document.
Obviously, this occurs.

Such a demonstration, however,

adds very little to a resolution of whether or not a contract in fact existed as respondent maintains.

The facts

as amply cited in this brief are otherwise.
On January 31, 1974, the receiver sought an order
of the court respecting the sale of the corporate assets
and asked that a hearing be held to consider the offers
received as of the date of the hearing.

The receiver

further sought, following the hearing, to have the court
issue an order ". . . authorizing the receiver to negotiate and execute an appropriate contract of sale of the
corporate assets. (Emphasis added.)" (R. 51)

Obviously,

the receiver's intent in making a motion to the court
prior to the February hearing, was not to have a contract approved.

At the February 6, 1974, hearing, the

receiver's counsel represented that the purpose of
the hearing'was ". . . (to have) the court determine
which of these constitutes highest and best offer,
and then request(ing) the court to authorize the
receiver to proceed to negotiate a firm and binding
contract of sale with the offeror who has presented
the highest and best offer" (emphasis added). (T.
February 6, 1974, p. 2)
After considering the offers of the owners and
First Media Corporation, the court entered its order
on February 22, 1974.

This order is in the record

(R. 173) and has been frequently quoted in the parties' briefs.

As the order indicates, it was not the

court's intention to form a contract with First Media
Corporation, but merely to direct that the report and
recommendation cf the receiver be accepted.

That this

is clear from the facts and the order itself is evident.

Respondent's counsel implicitly acknowledges

the clarity of this position when their position is
ultimately reduced to the argument that this entire
matter can only be understood and resolved as a result of determining what was meant by the placing of
a comma after "FMC, Inc."

Respondent's position at

best is an indication that the order is somewhat
unclear, and that the surrounding facts must be closely
examined.

An examination of the facts indicates a

contract was not consummated.
Because the March 15, 19 7 4 hearing was not
reported it was necessary for the Court to consider any
evidence offered by the parties as to what had
transpired at the time the order was formulated.
On June 28, 19 74 a hearing was held at v/hich time
Mr. Martineau, counsel for Shaw, indicated the
following concerning his recollection:
" . . . And I would just point out one thing;
At the hearing of the objection made by
Mr. Stott on behalf of Robison to the Court's
order of February 22nd, we had a hearing, and
although it's indicated in the Court record
it was reported, apparently it was not. But
at that hearing the Court was very explicit
in saying that this was merely an offer to
negotiate and the basis for a negotiation and
not an acceptance of an offer or sale as
such. The contract was entered by the Court
and approved by the Court. I am sure we all
proceeded on that basis.
"THE COURT: Your position simply I take
it is analogous to a probate proceeding where
the sale of the property is not final until
it is approved by the Court, is that right?
"MR. MARTINEAU: That is right."
(T. June 28, 19 74, p.6. Emphasis added.)

Similarly, on July 3, 1974 the affidavit of Gary
Stott, counsel for Robison, was offered into evidence
by Mr. Martineau as a further explanation of what had
occurred during the March 15th meeting.

Mr. Stott in

his affidavit stated the following:
"4. On or about March 6, 1974, your
affiant had submitted to the Court on behalf
of Robison, an Objection to the Court's order
Approving any Sale of KOVO to FMC. That
hearing which I believe was heard on March 15,
1974, The Honorable Allen B. Sorensen advised
your affiant and those present at that hearing
that he had not approved any sale to FMC; that
he was only approving the right of the
Receiver to negotiate with FMC for the purpose
of seeing if a sale of KOVO could be arrived
at. Your affiant does not recall whether that
hearing was reported, but does recall specifically that my objection was heard by the
Court and that pursuant to my objection the
Court advised those present at that hearing
that no sale was being approved at that time."
(R. 310-311. Emphasis added.)
The trial court, however, refused to accept this
affidavit on the grounds that it was hearsay but did
allow it to be proffered as proof.

This rejection of

the affidavit was made despite the acceptance into
evidence of newspaper articles offered by Mr. Greene,
counsel for FMC, which reported the various hearings
which had occurred.

(T. July 3, 1974, p. 3-5).

The failure of the Court to allow the affidavit of
Gary Stott into evidence was clearly error since
appellants were entitled to submit affidavits in
proceedings involving a determination of a Motion.

The

July 3, 1974 hearing together with the preceding
hearings were held pursuant to the Receiver's Motion to
authorize execution of the sale contract.

(R. 186-188).

This is made abundantly clear by the Court's order
referring to the Motion and reciting the various
hearings which were held between May and July of 1974.
CR. 400-410).
Thus f the proceedings at which the affidavit was
introduced was not that of a trial in which the Court
was a trier of facts but was proceedings to determine
the outcome of a Motion.

Rule 43(e) of the Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure unquestionably allows the introduction of affidavits into evidence.

This rule states:

"When a Motion is based on facts not appearing
of record the Court may hear the matter on
affidavits presented by the respective
parties, but the Court may direct that the
matter be heard wholly or partly on oral
testimony or depositions."
As has been stated:

"In general practice, affidavits may be used
to start in motion the process of the court
and are generally received as evidence upon
the hearing of Motions, irrespective of the
vital influence the latter may have upon the
final outcome of the suit." 3 Am. Jur. 2d,
§ 29, p.404.
Likewise:
"Where a Motion is based on facts not
appearing of record, the Court may, generally, in its discretion, either hear the
matter on affidavits presented by the
respective parties or direct the matter be
heard wholly or partially on oral testimony
or depositions. Generally, the admission of
oral testimony or depositions in addition to
affidavits is within the discretion of the
Court." 56 Am. Jur. 2d, § 26, p.21.
Therefore, the rule definitely allows the use of
affidavits into evidence for the purpose of establishing facts at a Motion unless the Court, in its
discretion, orders oral testimony or depositions to be
used in their place.

If this occurs, however, the

Court should allow the parties sufficient time to
obtain the witnesses or depositions if the affidavits
are refused since a party, as a normal course, presumes
that the affidavits are admissible in support of his
Motion,

Cf. 5 Moore's on Federal Practice, fl 43.13,

p.1385-1387.

The use; of affidavits in a proceeding confirming a
sale is clearly proper as demonstrated in the case of
Sheel v. Rinard, 430 P.2d 482 (Idaho 1967).
In that case respondents moved for an order
approving the sale of a ranch which had been the
subject of an injunction by the District Court*
Respondents relied upon the files and records of the
action and upon representations of fact recited in
respondents1 Motions.

The appellants opposed the

Motion by an affidavit in which they alleged that the
sale was at a price lower than the agreed sale between
the respondents and the appellants.

The affidavits

were admitted into evidence by the District Court.

In

discussing the use of affidavits in such a hearing the
Supreme Court of Idaho stated the following:
l!

[T]he District Court at the hearing on
respondents' Motion was not confined to any
particular method of receiving evidence. The
Court may require all evidence in support of
the Motion to be presented by affidavit, but
in its discretion the Court may also permit
other written or oral proof." Id. at 45.
Likewise in Beckett v. Kaynar Manufacturing Co.,

321 P.2d 749 (Cal. 1958), the Supreme Court of
California approved the use of affidavits during a

Motion for court confirmation of an arbitration award.
The Court specifically held that findings of fact and
conclusions of law were not necessary in the determination of a Motion.

Similarly, the findings of fact and

conclusions of law entered by the trial court in this
case (R. 403-410) were unnecessary in that they did not
relate to an action "tried upon the facts without a
jury."

(Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure).

Likewise, the Court's ruling that the affidavit could
be admitted as a proffer of proof was also erroneous
since the proceeding in which the affidavit was offered
was not "an action tried without a jury" and the
evidentiary requirements of hearsay are not present.
(Rule 43(c), U.R.C.P.).
Obviously, any affidavit is necessarily hearsay
but the Rules specifically allow the admission of
affidavits to establish facts at hearings on Motions.
Were this not the case the courts would be overrun with
evidentiary hearings where witnesses would have to be
present to testify to procedural matters.

Of course,

as noted previously, the Court can require more than
affidavits presuming that counsel are given notice that

affidavits will not be accepted.

This was clearly not

done by the Court in any other proceedings and it was
therefore error to exclude the affidavits without such
notification that the actual witness himself would have
to be present•
The effect of this exclusion was that there is
little evidence"introduced into the record on behalf of
appellants to support their position that the March 15,
1974 hearing did not result in a sale of KOVO assets
but merely resulted in the approval of the Court for
the Receiver to negotiate the sale.
Since this appeal is primarily concerned with whether
a binding contract was or was not consummated, the understanding of what transpired at this hearing and the exclusion
of this evidence was patently prejudicial to the appellants.
This Court must reverse the lower court's determination
so that the affidavit may be examined for its probative
value in establishing what transpired at this crucial
hearing.

A review of this competent evidence will

demonstrate there was no contract.

B.

Intervenor had notice of the Receiver's

limited authority and acquired no vested rights.
Respondent suggests that it acquired vested
rights by analogy to "fundamental principles of contract law".

(Respondent's Brief, p. 24)

Through-

out its entire argument on this point respondent
again ignores the basic point, that

"fundamental

principles of contract law" are modified and must

*

yield to the procedure necessary to foster orderly
judicial sales.
Respondent does not deny that all persons dealing with a receiver are chargeable with knowledge of
the limitations on the receiver's authority to act
or contract.

2 Clark on Receivers, § 433, p . 277.

Respondent further does not deny that it had notice
of the limitations on the receiver's authority.
Knowing of the limitations on the receiver's
authority, and being present at the hearings held
on the receiver's report, respondent cannot seriously
urge that they misunderstood, were misled, or acquired
any vested rights.
If, as respondent alleges, it acquired vested

.23 .

rights, when were the owners1 rights divested?

The

primary purpose of the receivership was to protect
the rights of the shareholders and the corporation,
yet the respondent would have us believe that, without notice, the owners rights were divested and bestowed upon an unrelated third party.

Such a position

is neither reasonable nor in accordance with well understood equitable principles applicable to this case.

POINT II.
THE CONTRACT OF SALE PROPOSED BY THE INTERVENOR WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM
ITS BID AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPROVED
BY THE LOWER COURT.
As indicated in Appellants1 initial Brief,

a

comparison of the initial letter offer of FMC (R. 141144) and the lengthy contract submitted to the court
for approval (R. 189-259), reveals not only numerous,
but substantial changes.

Respondent is correct in

suggesting that a difference in the length of the
documents does not necessarily reveal inconsistency.
(Respondent's Brief, p. 43)

However, as has earlier

been pointed out in this reply brief, there are many
onerous and unfair differences in favor of the intervener in the longer document.

,24.

This is amply demonstrated

by the inclusion of a $75,000 indemnity escrow, which
respondent's counsel suggests is "not inconsistent"
and mere "flesh on the bones".

It can only be remarked

that with a few "fleshing provisions" such as this
the remainder would not even be fit carrion.
Implicitly recognizing the numerous and substantial differences, respondent attempts to somehow
place responsibility on the owners for the unfair
changes. (Respondent's Brief, p. 45)
cannot be taken seriously.

Such suggestion

As indicated in Appellants1

initial Brief at page 45, the owners were not supplied
with certain pertinent documents until they specifically
requested them, and so had little to do with the negotiations.
There is no dispute that there were many unfair
changes made.

As indicated in respondent's brief,

respondent was hard-pressed to explain many of the discrepancies pointed out by appellants, and ultimately attempted
to ignore many of them when efforts to account for certain
major changes failed. (See Respondent's Brief, Note, p.
44, for an example of this.)
It is self-evident that even if in fact a binding
contract had been made on February 22, 1974,

the contract approved by the court should be disapproved and Rejected because of the many substantial
and unfair changes which were made.

CONCLUSION
In conducting a judicial sale, the court has
wide latitude in establishing the judicial procedure
to be employed.

Such flexibility is necessary to

account for the many exigent circumstances which may
be present.

Here the court permitted an alternative

approach to settlement because it was not an insolvency
proceeding.

Accordingly, when the owners resolved

these differences before a binding contract was made
and confirmed, the receivership should have been terminated.

Intervenor First Media Corporation had

knowledge of the limitations on the receiver's authority
and proceeded with a clear understanding that the receivership would be terminated if the owners resolved
these differences.
The motion of the receiver for approval of the
agreement, as to which the receiver and its counsel took
no position, should have been denied and the motion of

the parties for dismissal of the receivership action,
subject of course to proper safeguards and conditions,
should have been granted.
In the alternative this court should at the very
minimum remand this case to the lower court with instructions that it scrutinize with care all provisions
of any contract which it may hereafter approve to insure
not only fair consistency with the initial FMC offer but
adequate protection for the rights and interests of the
owners and KOVO as well.

Respectfully submitted,
REED L. MARTINEAU and
MICHAEL R. CARLSTON for
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
700 Continental Bank Building
Sdlt Lake City, Utah 84101
DEAN E. CONDER for
NIELSON, CONDER, HENRIOD &
GOTTFREDSON
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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